(2) In Capital,
Vol. I, chapter 7, among other places, Marx registers the
irony of "freedom" under capitalism:
For the
conversion of his money into capital, therefore, the owner
of money must meet in the market with the free labourer, free
in the double sense, that as a free man he can dispose of
his labour-power as his own commodity, and that on the other
hand he has no other commodity for sale, is short of everything
necessary for the realisation of his labour-power.
Is this
paradox still operative in contemporary American society? Discuss
with examples.
(3) In many
places in their writings Marx and Engels argue against the modern
concept of individualism. Here is an example from the introduction
to the Grundrisse,
an unfinished work in which Marx developed many of the ideas
that were to be published in Capital:
Production
by an isolated individual outside society -- a rare exception
which may well occur when a civilized person in whom the social
forces are already dynamically present is cast by accident
into the wilderness -- is as much of an absurdity as is the
development of language without individuals living together
and talking to each other.
Marx,
Grundrisse
The ideology
of individualism still informs popular common-sense and political
discourse. It is easy to see why the idea of individualism is
so appealing--it suggests that each person has an inherent autonomy
and freedom that is much to be desired. But why is it so important
for Marx to argue that individualism is an illusion?
(4) In The
German Ideology Marx and Engels reject the idealism
of the German philosophical tradition from Kant to Hegel. Whereas
previous philosophical traditions have assumed that truth and
meaning come from divine intervention (theistic or religion-based
systems) or from rational reflection (humanist and individualist
systems), Marx and Engels assert that truth and meaning are
produced by human societies (not by individuals working in isolation)
in historical and material circumstances. Here is a passage
that presents the main points of their argument:
In
direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven
to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to
say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive,
nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived,
in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real,
active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we
demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and
echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human
brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material
life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to
material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the
rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness,
thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They
have no history, no development; but men, developing their
material production and their material intercourse, alter,
along with this their real existence, their thinking and the
products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness,
but consciousness by life.
Drawing
on my webcast lectures and/or other sources that you are familiar
with, discuss one or more examples of idealist and/or humanist
philosophical systems--or religious, political or economic systems--
that de-emphasize the role of history and material production
in accounting for culture and social organization.
(5)
The relationship of base and superstructure and the question
of ideology are of key importance for a Marxist literary theory.
Marx doesn't address the production of literature in detail,
though in a famous passage from the Grundrisse
he briefly considers why classical Greek art remains popular
even in modern society. He doesn't come up with a satisfactory
answer, though poststructural theorists have done so--it's merely
that in fact a play by Sophocles isn't the same play (in terms
of its conditions of re-production) in the twentieth century,
that it was in ancient Greece. Discuss and evaluate the usefulness
of Marx's brief account of the seeming autonomy of artistic
production.
(6) Describe
and discuss Marx's theory of commodity fetishism (see Capital,
Chapter 1). Do you think Marx's analysis of the commodity
form is adequate to analyze the commodification of human experience
in our current moment of late capitalism?
(7) Walter
Benjamin argued that modern works of art retained an "aura"
that was in part a residual effect of the association of art
with ritual in premodern societies. Consider this "aura"
effect in relation to works of art in our contemporary "postmodern"
society. Does it still exist?
(8) Philip
Smith discusses Habermas's extension of the Frankfurt School
project in Chapter Three of Cultural Theory. Consider
Habermas's argument that the "system world" has been
consistently "invading" or "colonizing"
the "lifeworld" in late modernity and postmodernity.
Do you agree? Can you think of areas in which this invasion
or colonization has been resisted or reversed?
(9) Philip
Smith writes:
In
Dialectic of the Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer
argue that the project of the Enlightenment has reached a
dead end. It was supposed to bring human freedom and encourage
critical thinking. Yet rationality, reason and scientific
knowledge have brought with them the instrumental control
of social life. Instead of leading to an intelligent and caring
society, the Enlightenment has resulted in a world that is
shaped by a narrow, pragmatic form of rationality. Bureacratic,
technological, and ideological forces have limited human freedom
and created a mass society of passive, uniform consumers.
Social elites, by contrast, have consolidated their power
thanks to these shifts.
(Smith,
p. 46)
Discuss
this assessment of the Enlightenment project from the perspective
of 2007. Can you see any evidence that Adorno and Horkheimer
may have been too pessimistic?
(10) Adorno
and Horkheimer argue that mass broadcasting technology--they
are thinking of radio--produces a passive citizenry that can
be easily dominated by an authoritative elite. Some champions
of postmodernity have argued that the late twentieth-century
technological revolution, with the advent of "narrow-casting"
and the wide-spread access to the internet, represents a renewal
of democratic empowerment. What do you think about these arguments?
(11) Describe
and discuss any reactions and/or questions you have in response
to these readings that are not addressed in the topics suggested
above.